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Made in Misery: Mandating
Supply Chain Labor Compliance
ABSTRACT
Virtually all consumer products in the developed world are
produced in supply chain factories abroad. Media exposis
periodically reveal the deplorable working conditions in factories
that produce products for world-renowned brands. Public
institutions, however, tend to be too weak to enforce local labor
laws in the prime jurisdictionsfor supply chain manufacturing,
and the recent efforts of private regulators to maintain labor
standards throughout the chains have failed. This Note argues
that supply chain labor compliance ought to be mandatory, not
aspirational. Several examples of innovative public-private
partnershipshave delivered on the promise of supply chain labor
maintenance. In order to scale-up those successful programs, both
public and private actors must orchestrate a transnational
enforcement mechanism. Each downstream actor, in its own
specialized capacity, must influence actors upstream to enforce
labor compliance.
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I. INTRODUCTION

International outsourcing has become a hallmark of the modern
economy.' On the campaign trail, Donald J. Trump put companies on
notice that outsourcing would be reversed under his presidency.
Trump's "re-shoring" or "insourcing" plan-the idea that as the cost of
manufacturing in developing nations increases, manufacturing jobs
will return to developed countries-underscores the lack of nuance
behind such a policy. 2 Manufacturers will not be driven back to
developed countries, but rather will seek out alternative countries in
the developing world with more favorable manufacluring conditions. 3
Outsourcing appears to be a permanent market feature, and therefore
the workers that assemble most consumer products will remain
abroad. To ensure that products have not been made under abhorrent
working conditions, the transnational community must orchestrate a
comprehensive supply chain maintenance framework.

1.
Ronald Jones, Henryk Kierzkowski & Chen Lurong, What Does Evidence Tell
Us About Fragmentationand Outsourcing?, 14 INT'L REV. OF ECON. AND FIN. 305, 315
(2005); see also Matea Gold et al., Ivanka Inc., WASH. POST (July 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/politics/ivanka-trumpoverseas/?utmterm=.014d82f4984e [https:/perma.cc/TS73-UL74
(archived Jan. 5,
2018) ("Industry experts say about 97 percent of all clothing and shoes purchased in the
United States is imported from countries where wages are lower and products can be
made more cheaply.").
2.
Tim Leunig, 'Reshoring'Jobsfrom China Won't Happen, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 30,
2011),
https://www.ft.com/contentbd30cO94-0151-1 1el-b 177-00144feabdcO
[https://perma.cc/QP9B-LC8W] (archived Mar. 3, 2017).
3.
. Steve Tobak, What Trump Doesn't UnderstandAbout Outsourcing, Fox Bus.
(Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/02/07/what-trump-doesntunderstand-about-outsourcing.html [https://perma.cclFGN3-J8D4] (archived Mar. 3,
2017); see, e.g., Associated Press, Workers From Factory Making Ivanka Trump Shoes
Tell of Long Hours, Low Pay, Abuse, VOA NEWS
(June 28, 2017),
https://www.voanews.com/a/workers-from-factory-making-ivanka-trump-shoes-longhours-low-pay-abuse/3920047.htm1 [https://perma.cc/96AZ-DHNV] (archived Oct. 27,
2017) ("Huajian, [a Chinese shoe manufacturing company], . . . has been moving
production to Ethiopia, where workers make around $100 a month, much less than what
is paid in China. . . .").

2018]

REINFORCING LINKS IN THE CHAIN

299

While intra-industry trade-the flow of goods within the same
industry--comprises a large portion of international trade between
developed countries, international outsourcing has introduced
developing countries as major players in the world market.4 From 2004
to 2008, the value of outsourcing contracts ranged from $85 billion to
$97 billion worldwide. 5 The trade in parts or components of a final
product has proven more cost-efficient for firms than intra-firm
production in many industries.6 Developments in telecommunications,
finance, and neoliberal trade policies have enabled firms to produce
goods at a lower cost by fragmenting the stages of production, often
across the globe.7
On the whole, developing countries lack the robust regulatory and
enforcement frameworks possessed by their developed counterparts.8
Even when developing nations have robust labor protections on paper,
their public institutions are generally too weak to enforce them on the
ground. 9 The developing countries' labor markets, therefore, have a
comparative advantage over the labor forces in developed countries.1 0
The absence of regulatory safeguards for labor conditions effectively
lowers the cost of labor in the developing world as compared to the
developed world." Although firms are tasked with coordinating the
modularized production system and transporting the goods from one
stage to the next, the savings in the costs of labor exceed the added
transactional costs. Developing nations, therefore, are presented as
prime locations to modularize the manufacturing of component parts.12
Indeed, a survey of three hundred high-ranking corporate executives
revealed that the most attractive destinations for offshore activities are
India, China, and Latin America.' 3

4.
Jones, Kierzkowski & Lurong, supra note 1, at 306.
5.
Margaret M. Blair, Erin O'Hara O'Connor & Gregg Kirchhoefer,
Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm, 2011 BYU L. REV. 263, 265 n.1
(2011).
6.
Jones, Kierzkowski & Lurong, supra note 1, at 306.
7.
Blair, O'Hara O'Connor & Kirchhoefer, supra note 5, at 263 (referring to the
process by which firms outsource the stages of production as "modularization"); Jones,
Kierzkowski & Lurong, supra note 1, at 306.
Blair, O'Hara O'Connor & Kirchhoefer, supra note 5, at 266; Didimo Castillo
8.
Fernandez & Adrian Sotelo Valencia, Outsourcingand the New Labor Precariousnessin
Latin America, 40 LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES 14, 16 (2013).

See Tim Bartley, Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules:
9.
Intersections of Public and PrivateStandards, 12 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 517, 538 (2011)
(pointing out that Indonesian labor law is in fact quite strong on paper, but not enforced
in practice); Kevin Kolben, DialogicalLabor Regulation in the Global Supply Chain, 36
MICH. J. INT'L L. 425, 434 (2015).
10.
Castillo Fernandez & Sotelo Valencia, supra note 8, at 15.
Id.; see also Gold et al., supra note 1 ("[Al denim shirt that cost $3.72 to make
11.
in Bangladesh would cost more than three times as much to make in the United States.").
12.
Castillo Fernandez & Sotelo Valencia, supra note 8, at 15-16.
13.
Id.
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'

The corporations investing in international outsourcing have a
strong interest in perpetuating substandard working conditions,
particularly in those developing regions mentioned above. 14 In part,
the cost advantage of outsourcing is the product of discounts on
workplace safety and worker rights protections.' 5 As a result, principal
corporations are reticent to urge their suppliers to raise the labor
standards at their factories unless reputational consequences would
harm the principal corporations' bottom lines.1 6 Otherwise, a firm-wide
policy to raise labor standards at outsourcing facilities may very well
undermine the gains the firm yields by outsourcing.' 7
Historically, consumer demand has driven change in the labor
conditions of manufacturing workplaces in the developed world. While
campaigns for sweatshop labor reform organized by consumers can be
an effective strategy for changing corporate behavior, typically a highly
publicized tragedy must strike in order to galvanize consumers.1 8 The
infamous Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire revealed the consequences
of the poor treatment of factory workers during the Industrial
Revolution in the United States.' 9 The company had a policy of locking
the workers inside, and the public outcry after the workers in the
factory were unable to escape the flames precipitated labor law
change. 20 Likewise, the more recent collapse at Rana Plaza in
Bangladesh temporarily incited conisumer outrage and a renewed
interest in reforming labor conditions in the manufacturing sector.2
However, manufacturing is no longer contained within the borders
of a single state, and laborers and consumers are no longer constituents
of the same politicians. Since the manufacturing sector is now largely
outsourced to suppliers abroad, the developed world's consumer base-

14.

RICHARD

M. LOCKE,

THE PROMISE AND

LIMITS OF

PRIVATE

POWER:

PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 12-13 (2013); Scott Eric
Kaufman, "No one is making them stop": Why CorporationsOutsource Catastrophe-and
Workers Pay the Price, SALON (July 6, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/
07/06/no one-is-making-them-stop-why-corporations-outsource-catastrophe-and-wo
rkers-pay-the-price/ [https://perma.cc/JEN4-3ADE] (archived Feb. 27, 2017).
15.
LOCKE, supra note 14, at 14; Castillo Fernandez & Sotelo Valencia, supra
note 8.

16.
17.
18.
forgotten?,

See Kolben, supra note 9, at 438.
See Kaufman, supra note 14.
See Kolben, supra note 9, at 438; see, e.g., BBC, Rana Plaza: A lesson
BBC

WORLD

SERVICE:

IN

THE

BALANCE

(June

9,

2015),

fhttps://perma.ccl8BAQ-TAXK] (archived Feb. 27, 2017).
19.
D. BERLINER ET AL., LABOR STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS:
ALIGNING RIGHTS AND INCENTIVES 1 (2015).

20.
Id. at 1, 5; Kaufman, supra note 14 (explaining that consumer outrage after
the Triangle Shirtwaist fire yielded stronger fire safety codes, building codes, and
workplace safety requirements and marked a turning point for American labor
conditions).
21.
Rana Plaza:A lesson forgotten?, supra note 18.
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and thereby voter base-has considerably less leverage to force labor
reforms in key jurisdictions. 22
The increased complexity and the international character of
manufacturing as a result of outsourcing have demanded a creative
solution to raise labor standards. Over the past two decades, the
consumer push for corporate social responsibility has produced several
private methods of ensuring labor law compliance, such as voluntary
codes adopted by individual firms, collective standards adopted by a
consortium, and non-profits dedicated to certifying corporations and
inspecting foreign suppliers.23 The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC)
published a model code of conduct that requires its licensees to promote
freedom of association at their supply chain factories. 24 Non-profits
like "B Lab" assess traditional corporations dedicated to considering
the interests of "stakeholders" in business decisions.2 5 Worldwide
Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP), the Fair Labor
Association (FLA), and similar organizations inspect and certify.
factories abroad that comply with certain workplace safety and worker.
rights standards.2 6 Through this certification mechanism, brands can
advertise to their consumers that they only outsource to suppliers with
certain labor standards.2 7
While these developments in non-profit oversight and certification
seemingly align the interests of suppliers, principal corporations, and
workers, actors have conceived of ways to game the certification
systems.2 8 Principal firms have little reason to directly intervene when

22.

BERLINER ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.

23.

Bartley, supra note 9, at 518.

24.

WORKER

RIGHTS

CONSORTIUM,

MODEL

CODE

OF

CONDUCT

(2007),

[https://perma.cclDX3C-Q3NF] (archived Feb. 27, 2017).
25.
Frequently Asked Questions: What Are Stakeholders? Why Do They Matter?,
B

LAB,

http://www.bimpactassessment.net/how-it-works/frequently-asked-questions/

the-basics#what-are-stakeholders?-why-do-they-matter [https://perma.cc/X7ME-CD44]
(archived Oct. 27, 2017) ("Stakeholders are the individuals that are most closely affected
by a business's activities. These may include workers, customers, suppliers,
shareholders, community members and others.").
26.

See

History,

WORLDWIDE

fhttps://perma.cc/FP9Z-GVJ6]
ASSOCIATION,

(archived

RESPONSIBLE

Feb. 27,

http://www.fairlabor.org/our-work

ACCREDITED

PRODUCTION,

2017); Our Work, FAIR LABOR
[https://perma.cc/35DC-KP5A]

(archived Feb. 27, 2017).
APPLE,
Labor
&
Human
Rights,
27.
Supplier
Responsibility:
http://www.apple.com/supplier-responsibility/labor-and-human-rights/
fhttps://perma.cc/NG5Q-BEWQ] (archived Feb. 27, 2017) ("We continue to publish a
semi-annual list of the ... Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSP) participation status of
the smelters and refiners in our supply chain."); Why Become a B Corp?, B LAB,
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/why-become-a-b-corp
2DWP-J33G] (archived Oct. 27, 2017); see, e.g., Supply Chain Approach, ADIDAS (last
visited Nov. 7, 2017), [https://perma.cc/MHK2-K5PW] (archived Feb. 27, 2017); NIKE,
SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS REPORT FY 14-15, at 52, https://s3.amazonaws.com/nikeinc/
[https://perma.cc/
assets/56356/NIKEFY14-15_SustainableBusinessReport.pdf
WAA7-JVHG] (archived Jan. 29, 2017).
28.
See, e.g., Blair, O'Hara O'Connor & Kirchhoefer, supra note 5, at 281 n.55
(explaining that a factory in the Dominican Republic was able to receive labor standard
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the compliance monitoring mechanisms in place insulate them from
backlash to a failure in supplier compliance.2 9 And the laws of the
countries in which firms are incorporated do not impose liability on
parent companies for the misdeeds of their manufacturing
subcontractors abroad.30
Moreover, not all component parts are manufactured and sold
directly to the parent company. 3 1 Supply chains are often comprised of
multiple stages of production in several factories that supply one
another-hence the "chain" moniker. 32 Some suppliers may, as a
business practice, obscure the names of subcontractors or other
upstream suppliers to ensure that buyers do not make dealings
without the first-tier supplier.3 3 As a result, there is no incentive for
the suppliers or buyers to ensure that the factory preceding them in
the chain has adequate labor protections. 34 If an upstream supplier has
labor violations in its factory, the first-tier supplier and buyer can
plead ignorance.35
Supply chain contracts between parent companies and suppliers
have also undergone a transformation in response to consumer outrage
over preventable industrial accidents. It is now commonplace for

certification from a non-profit organization by partitioning off the workers whose
employment conditions did not meet the non-profit's certification standards).
29.
LOCKE, supra note 14, at 12-13.
See, e.g., Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming
30.
the dismissal of contract claims filed by employees of Wal-Mart's international suppliers
on the grounds that violations of the minimum labor conditions specified in the code of
conduct as part of supply chain contracts were not enforceable against Wal-Mart).
31.
LOCKE, supra note 14, at 4-9.
32.
See id.
First-tier suppliers or brokers will use "back-to-back" letters of credit in order
33.
to hide the identity of an upstream subcontractor. A back-to-back credit is a financing
instrument using two separate letters of credit. The first letter of credit is issued from
the buyer's bank to the supplier's or broker's bank. The second letter of credit is issued
from the first-tier supplier's or broker's bank to the subcontractor's bank. In effect, the
buyer is either unaware that the purchased goods were manufactured by a subcontractor
or simply not privy to the subcontractor's identity. The first-tier suppliers have vested
interests in keeping the subcontractor's identity from the buyer, because they fear that
the buyers would contract directly with the subcontractors-making the first-tier
suppliers

and brokers obsolete. DANIEL C. K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 229-30 (3d ed. 2015).
34.

LOCKE, supra note 14, at 10.

See, e.g., Matea Gold et al., supra note 1 (quoting an Ivanka Trump brand
35.
spokeswoman who assured that the brand's suppliers uphold "the highest standards"
and that Ivanka only used the most reputable suppliers); see also Associated Press, supra
note 3 (explaining that Ivanka Trump's brand had no comment when sweatshop labor
conditions were revealed at the same company factories she praised earlier and workers
helping investigate the factory were arrested); Drew Harwell, Workers at Chinese factory
used by Ivanka Trump's clothing maker endured long hours, low pay, CHI. TRIB. (Apr.
25, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-ivanka-trump-chinese-factory20170425-story.html [http://perma.cc/N4CJ-H2PB] (archived Nov. 5, 2017) (showing
that Ivanka Trump praised an FLA-certified manufacturing company with an exclusive
license to produce her clothing line for "distinguish[ing] itself as a trusted partner").
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.

supply chain contracts to contain labor provisions.3 6 Parent companies
have, in effect, attempted to supplement or layer public labor
regulation with private contract provisions.3 7 Whether these
provisions are actually enforced between principal and supplier to
raise the standards of workforce safety and improve worker treatment
remains to be seen.3 8 Labor provisions and non-profit certifications
may very well serve to absolve a parent company of wrongdoing in the
court of public opinion in the event of an accident or an expose
revealing sweatshop conditions in the parent company's supply
chain.3 9
A clear trend has emerged in response to public outcry over supply
chain labor conditions: private actors are assuming the role of
regulator where public governance used to reign supreme. 40 The
emergence of non-profit oversight of supply chain labor practices and
the addition of labor provisions in supply chain contracts raises new
questions with regard to transnational labor governance. Scholarship
over the past decade indicates that private labor regulation alone.
cannot replace labor law enforcement by strong public institutions. 41
The principal query is no longer whether those private governance
mechanisms have been more effective than public governance
mechanisms in raising labor standards across supply chains. 42 Rather,
the new challenge in eradicating the pernicious problem of supply
chain labor management is outlining the ways in which public

Michael Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
36.
2029, 2066 (2005).
Bartley, supra note 9, at 520-22; Vandenbergh, supra note 36, at 2083.
37.
38.

Dara

O'Rourke,

Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing

Nongovernmental

Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 1, 10 (2003) (reporting
that little research has been performed on the efficacy of codes of conduct in raising labor
standards, although certain brands have severed ties with factories that repeatedly
violate the labor provisions in the brand's code of conduct). But see Doe v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009) (plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart declined to
exercise its right of inspection to ensure compliance with the labor provisions provided
in supply chain contracts with its supplier factories around the world).
39.
See Sophia Chabbot, Everything You Need to Know About the Allegations
Against
Beyonc6's
Ivy
Park
Line,
GLAMOUR
(May
16,
2016),
http://www.glamour.com/story/sweatshop-allegations-against-beyonce-ivy-park-line
[https://perma.ccfH7UE-7G3L] (archived Feb. 27, 2017) (quoting an Ivy Park
spokesperson who deflected criticisms of the sweatshop labor conditions discovered in its
Sri Lankan supplier factories by pointing to the fact that the brand only contracts with
certified compliant suppliers); Declan Walsh & Steven Greenhouse, Inspectors Certified
PakistaniFactory as Safe Before Disaster,N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2012) (pointing out that
a Pakistani garment factory was certified under Social Accountability International
safety standards only weeks before 300 workers were killed in a factory fire when the
exit doors were locked).
40.
Kolben, supra note 9, at 436.
41.
LOCKE, supra note 14, at 156-57.
42.
See id. at 172.
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governance and private governance can complement and reinforce one
another. 43
This Note analyzes the functions and failures of public and private
governance tools in the supply chain labor context. The proffered
solution harnesses the various actors' interests in each link on the
chain to raise labor standards through complementary public and
private governance mechanisms. In Part II, this Note discusses the
characteristics of the countries ripe for outsourcing contracts and the
state of labor standards in supply chain factories across the globe. Part
III analyzes the shortfalls of both public and private governance
mechanisms designed to raise supply chain labor standards. Part TV
proposes an approach that each actor in the supply chain can take to
reinforce the notion that worker rights are human rights and empower
workers on an international scale.

II. THE PRIME CONDITIONS FOR SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTING
A. The Macro Level
Corporate firms consider various criteria to assess a country's
potential as a location for outsourcing. Latin America, for example, is
notorious for flexible labor laws that permit long work hours, limited
working class power, short vacation time, high labor turnover, and poor
workplace safety standards. 4 4 Latin American countries' geographic
location, access to cheap natural resources, and low-cost materials also
make them attractive for offshore contracting. 4 5 Firms tend to place a
premium on access to certain resources in considering an offshoring
candidate. For example, in a study of North American corporations, 69
percent reported that they consider the labor costs, 49 percent
contemplated the country's technology and infrastructure, 48 percent
considered the availability of a qualified labor force, 44 percent looked
at the country's economic stability, and 41 percent weighed the
country's language dominance. 46
Competition among developing countries to attract outsourcing
contracts is cutthroat. This is driven by the fact that "international
firms go to a great deal of trouble to spot even minute cost
differences." 4 7 In order to gain a competitive advantage in the race for
outsourcing contracts, developing countries' governments have

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 156-81.
Castillo Fernandez & Sotelo Valencia, supra note 8, at 16.
Id.
Id.
Jones, Kierzkowski & Lurong, supra note 1, at 308.
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commoditized their workforces. 4 8 To attract foreign investors,
governments undermine workers' legal protections and neutralize
labor unions. Since outsourcing corporations aim to avoid investing in
infrastructure or operation costs and seek a flexible workforce,
cooperative regulators are an essential component when choosing an
offshoring locale. 49 Mexico and Brazil, for example, experienced labor
reforms and a general compromise on worker protections in the wake
of the outsourcing boom. 50 Brazil has instated "pro-business reforms,
reduced wages, increased factory automation, and layoffs" at the
expense of domestic workers. 5 1 Similarly, Mexican workforce
management strategies have been overhauled, resulting in dilution of
worker rights, decline in work safety conditions, and reduction in
wages. 52
Supply chains grow more complex as countries' comparative
advantages fluctuate.
Formerly, the divide between parent
corporations and supplying manufacturers was cleanly separated by
entities based in developed countries and developing countries.53 The
difference can no longer be fairly characterized through this dichotomy.
China and India, although still considered "developing," contain both
downstream multinational corporations (MNCs) and upstream
suppliers-meaning they have actors at every point of the supply
chain. 54
A picture of the complex manufacturing operations in a global
economy can be seen through the journey of a single pair of athletic
shoes. In the early 1900s, some of the first athletic shoes were both
marketed and manufactured in the United States.55 By contrast, 85
percent of the world's shoe exports are now sourced from Asia. 56 A
single Nike cross-trainer was tracked throughout its downstream
manufacturing tour. The shoe was put together in Tangerang,
Indonesia at a Korean-owned factory.5 7 Its component parts, however,
were sourced from various locations. First, the design and product
specifications were shipped from Nike's Oregon headquarters to a
Taiwanese design firm.5 8 The Taiwanese designers fleshed out the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Castillo Fernandez & Sotelo Valencia, supra note 8, at 16.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.

53.

See K.C. FUNG ET AL., BEYOND MINERALS: CHINA-LATIN AMERICAN TRANS-

No.
5,
2015),
4
(BOFIT
Policy
Brief
PACIFIC
SUPPLY
CHAIN
https://helda.helsinki.filbof/bitstream/handle/123456789/13808/bpb0515%5Bl%5D.pdf?
sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/Z6V5-9STA] (archived Feb. 27, 2017).
Id.
54.
LOCKE, supra note 14, at 4.
55.
56.
Id. at 4-5.
57.
Id. at 5.
John C. Ryan & Alan Thein Durning, The Story of a Shoe, WORLD WATCH
58.
29 (Mar.-Apr. 1998).
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blueprints and sent those to South Korean engineers.5 9 The Korean
firm then outsourced the production of the shoes to Indonesia.6 0
The Nike cross-trainers were composed of three parts: the upper
sole, the midsole, and the outsole. 6 1 The upper sole was made from
leather from cattle slaughtered and skinned in Texas and sent to South
Korea for tanning. 62 After the thirty-stage tanning process, the leather
of the upper sole was sent to the Indonesian factory for assembly.6 3 The
midsole was composed of ethylene vinyl acetate (EVA) foam, which
originated in Saudi Arabia in the form of refined petroleum. 64 The
petroleum was shipped from Saudi Arabia to Korea for further
refinement and transformation to foam form. 65 The EVA foam was
subsequently shipped to the Indonesian factory for final assembly. 66
Finally, the outsole, made of rubber-a byproduct of petroleum-was
refined in South Korea and shipped to Taiwan to be processed into
rubber sheets before it was sent to the Indonesian factory. 67
Throughout the entire manufacturing process, an estimated 200 people
had a role in assembling just one pair of athletic shoes. 68
B. The Micro Level
The anti-sweatshop movement of the 1990s publicly revealed the
stark truth about the manufacture of consumer products. Namely, the
movement demonstrated that the products were manufactured in
factories abroad characterized by low wages, poor working conditions,
long hours, and often child labor. As the cost of production came to
light, consumers recognized the steep markups that apparel companies
applied to their products in the developed markets. By one estimate,
Macy's had been marking up bras, produced in Mexico at a total cost of
$6.50, by 300 percent. 69 Similarly, an $80 pair of Nike shoes costs only
twelve cents for labor in Indonesia.7 0
Firms with exposed sweatshops in their supply chains warned that
an increase in labor stapdards would be followed by a corresponding

Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
68.
LoCKE, supra note 14, at 6.
69.
Andrew Ross, Dress to Oppress, ARTFORUM INT'L MAG. 18 (Mar. 1996),
https://www.questia.com/read/lG1-18403690/dress-to-oppress
[https://perma.cc/9JSSBLK2] (archived Jan. 11, 2018) (subscription required).
Id.
70.
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increase in price. 1 However, a significant number of consumers polled
said that they would be comfortable paying 10 percent more for a
product if they were assured that the products were produced by
workers making a living wage. 72 Since the anti-sweatshop movement
of the 1990s, little headway was made to ensure that workers in supply
chains received a living wage. 3
The maquiladora industry74 in Honduras, Guatemala, and El
Salvador comprises 65 percent, 55 percent, and 42 percent,
respectively, of its exported products to the United States.7 5 The
maquiladoras employ approximately 120,000 Hondurans, 150,000
Guatemalans, and 80,000 El Salvadorans. 76 These employees are
reported to receive, as a daily wage, on average 13 percent of the
federal minimum wage in the United States.77 Only a handful of
multinational corporations are the main contractors to these
factories-Hanes, Fruit of the Loom, Nike, Adidas, and Gildan
Activewear-but these companies have the negotiating power to affect
minimum wages across Central America. 78

71.
Associated Press, supra note 3 (explaining why Chinese manufacturers
moved production from China to Ethiopia, where manufacturing labor was cheaper, a
factory manager stated that "[t]he American clients push down the price. Consumers
want to buy cheaper shoes").
72.
Join ETI, ETHIcAL TRADE INITIATIVE, https://www.ethicaltrade.org/join-

etilbusiness-case [https://perma.cclV953-STJ9] (archived Oct. 28, 2017).
Mateo Crossa, Maquiladora Industry Wages in Central America Are Not
73.
22,
2015),
RES.
(May
EcoN.
&
POL'Y
CTR.
FOR
Living
Wages,
http://www.globalresearch.calmaquiladora-industry-wages-in-central-america-are-not-

living-wages/545112 [https://perma.ccZ34T-Z6C2] (archived Feb. 27, 2017); see, e.g.,
Caroline Mortimer, Unpaid labourers who slipped pleas for help into Zara clothes 'have
24,
2017),
(Nov.
wages',
INDEP.
their
back
not
received
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/zara-workers-unpaid-help-notes-

clothes-back-wages-turkish-workers-bravo-tekstil-clean-clothes-a807 3136.html
[https://perma.cclMWZ5-HK7V] (archived Jan. 1, 2018) (exposing that workers at a
Turkish factory producing for Zara sewed pleas onto clothing tags to bring attention to
the fact that had been unpaid for their labor); see also Elizabeth MacBride, Jens
Hainmueller:Will Consumers Actually Pay for Fair Trade?, STAN. Bus.: INSIGHTS (Apr.
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/jens-hainmueller-will-consumers8,
2015),
(archived Oct. 28, 2017)
[https://perma.cclY7RF-DA6P]
actually-pay-fair-trade
(explaining that even when companies justify price increases by using fair trade
certification labels it is not clear that the price difference benefits workers abroad).
74.
The term "maquiladora" was coined to describe the clusters of factories along
the U.S.-Mexican border. Now the term describes factories in Mexico and Central

America where raw materials are imported on a duty-free or tariff-free basis for
assembly. The goods are subsequently exported back to the country of origin of the raw
materials. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/maquiladora

[https://perma.cc/6PCC-G8FD] (archived Oct. 28, 2017).
75.
Crossa, supra note 73.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id. (explaining that Central American governments ignored demands to
increase maquiladora workers' minimum wage after the multi-national brands that
purchase from the maquilas pressured the governments to keep wages low).
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The wages received by workers in Honduras, Guatemala, and El
Salvador fall woefully short of the salaries necessary for basic
necessities in each of the countries.7 9 Even so, maquiladora workers in
these three countries have been pushed to be more flexible in order to
meet the low wage competition from China and the deceleration of the
United States' economy. 8 0 Critics argue that even though supply chain
employees make a fraction of the developed world's minimum wage,
supply chain factory jobs offer a higher paid alternative to other nonmaquiladora jobs. 8 ' In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis,
however, wages for maquiladora workers fell below those of nonmaquiladora workers.8 2 The gap between wages of maquiladora
workers and non-maquiladora workers has only continued to widen
since then.8 3
Newspaper articles exposing "modern slavery" in textile and
apparel factories are still common, especially in factories that produce
celebrities' fashion lines.8 4 Notables from Beyonc6 to Ivanka Trump
have been accused of contracting sweatshop factories abroad to
manufacture their products.85 Beyonce's Ivy Park "athleisure" line
came under fire after a Sri Lankan factory contracted by the brand
allegedly employed sweatshop labor practices.8 6 A spokesperson for the
Ivy Park brand reported that the factory was owned by MAS Holdings,
which had been vetted, and the brand assured that it audited and
inspected the factories to make sure they met the standards set in its
code of conduct.8 7 Ivanka Trump, on the other hand, declined to
comment on the workers' accounts of inhumane work hours and
meager wages at Xuankai Footwear Limited in China, where her shoe
lines are manufactured.8 8

Id.
79.
Id. (explaining that maquila workers' wages have been stagnated in order to
80.
accommodate factory owners in the wake of the U.S. market contraction).
81.
See, e.g., David Skarbek et al., Sweatshops, Opportunity Costs, and NonMonetary Compensation: Evidence from El Salvador, 71 AM. J. OF ECON. AND Soc. 539,
540 (2012).
82.
Crossa, supra note 73.
See id. (showing that in 2008, the Honduran government approved a 60
83.
percent wage increase for all workers except maquila workers, which made the minimum
wage for non-maquila workers significantly higher than maquila workers' minimum
wage).

See, e.g., Chabbot, supra note 39; Rose Walano, Ivanka Trump's Footwear
84.
Line Is Under Fire for Alleged Sweatshop Conditions, US MAG., (Oct. 13, 2016),
http://www.usmagazine.com/stylish/news/ivanka-trumps-shoe-line-allegedlymistreating-factory-workers-w444734 [https://perma.cc/FN65-SMMU] (archived Feb.
27, 2017).
85.
Chabbot, supra note 39; Walano, supranote 84.
86.
Chabbot, supra note 39.
Id.
87.
88.
Compare Gold et al., supra note 1 (noting that Ivanka Trump's brand relies
on its suppliers to follow the company's code of conduct, but declined to reveal the
pertinent language in its code of conduct that prohibits physical abuse and child labor),
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Perhaps the most notorious stories of factory worker abuse, on
behalf of the developing markets' demand, arise from the Foxconn
Technology Group's factories.89 The Foxconn factories are noted for
their contracts with Apple to assemble the technology giant's
iPhones.90 In the Henan province, Foxconn employs a whopping
190,000 workers in the Zhengzhou factory alone. 9 ' Numerous workers
in Foxconn's Chinese factories have committed suicide; other factories
have experienced explosions; and still others have been rocked by
employee riots, with participants numbering in the thousands.9 2
Apple, the Cupertino, California-based company, claims that Foxconn
meets the rigorous labor standards it sets for its 1.1 million
employees.93 After more than a dozen suicides in Chinese factories in
2010, Foxconn contracted with a third party auditor to monitor the
working conditions at its factories. 94 And yet, more than eight years
later, workers continue to take their own lives, wages have been
depressed as demand for iPhones has decreased, and it has become
more difficult for factory workers to meet the standards required to
receive overtime pay.95
The conditions in supply chain factories are particularly
dangerous for women workers. Gender-based violence perpetrated on
96
the part of employers is particularly common in Mexican maquilas.
Luz Estela Castro, Director of the Center for Human Rights for Women
of Chihuahua, notes that the crimes committed against female
maquiladora workers often go uninvestigated, allowing employers to

and Walano, supra note 84 (claiming that multiple brands, including Ivanka Trump's,
have declined to comment on repeated allegations of worker abuse at a Chinese factory
contracted to supply their products), with Gold et al., supra note 1 (showing that H&M
threatened to pull its business from a factory unless the factory reinstated workers fired
for organizing a strike and factory owners dropped criminal complaints against the
workers for strking), and O'Rourke, supra note 38, at 10 (explaining that Nike has
canceled contracts with supplier subcontractors with persistent labor violations).
89.
See, e.g., Eva Dou, Deaths of Foxconn Employees Highlight Pressures Faced
J.
(Aug.
22,
2016),
Workers,
WALL
ST.
by
China's
Factory
http://www.wsj.comlarticles/deaths-of-foxconn-employees-highlight-pressures-faced-by[https://perma.cc/844T-FXH]
(subscription
chinas-factory-workers- 1471796417
required).
Id.
90.
Jay Greene, Riots, Suicides, and Other Issues in Foxcona's iPhone Factories,
91.
CNET (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.cnet.com/news/riots-suicides-and-other-issues-infoxconns-iphone-factories/ [https://perma.cclC2X6-R2FJ] (archived Feb. 27, 2017).
92.
Id.
93.
Dou, supra note 89; Greene, supra note 91.
94.
Dou, supra note 89.
95.
Id.; Greene, supranote 91.
Gabriel Bolio, Sufre violencia 42% de las trabajadorasen maquilas, EL
96.
MILENIO
(June
23,
2016,
2:19
AM),
http://www.milenio.com/negocios/trabajadorasen-maquilas-violenciatrabajadoras[https://perma.ccZUM9-5EG7]
cemefi-responsabilidad social_0_761323965.html
(archived Feb. 27, 2017) (noting that around 42 percent of female maquiladora workers
reported being assaulted by their employer).
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sexually abuse and physically abuse employees with impunity.9 7
Mexico, of course, is not the only site of sexual assault in supply chains.
In fact, sexual assault is commonplace in Bangladeshi, Cambodian,
Indian, Pakistani, Turkish, Thai, and Vietnamese factories.9 8

III. A TUG OF WAR OVER SUPPLY CHAIN MAINTENANCE BETWEEN
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC GOVERNANCE REGIMES

In the wake of reports of supply chain accidents and worker
mistreatment, global activists and labor organizations have pressured
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) to provide remedies for the
regulatory weaknesses in their suppliers' countries of origin.9 9 These
"governance deficits" occur when "consumers, the state, and global civil
society demand labor regulations that are higher, different, or better
enforced than the state where the supplier is located is either willing
or able to supply."1 00
MNCs have responded to governance deficits and stakeholder
demand for gap-filling through a number of private governance
solutions. For example, some MNCs have employed internal
compliance departments, contracted with third parties to monitor
factory compliance, or joined consortiums that publish labor codes of
conduct to respond to governance deficits.10 1 Other private regulatory
compliance mechanisms, completely free of corporate involvement,
have cropped up to address state regulatory failures. 10 2 Independent
and private supply chain oversight systems include instances where
universities, consumer groups, and transnational activists monitor
MNCs' supply chains for compliance with labor law. Both the
corporate-controlled and independent private monitoring efforts are
3
termed "transnational private labor regulation" (TPLR).10
Private governance methodologies have become a popular solution
to deficiencies in public governance of supply chain labor, although this
is not to say that the role of public governance has been wholly
displaced.1 04 Legislators in suppliers' countries continue to pass labor

97.
Femicidio en Edomex: Una mujer es golpeada, violada y empalada en una
casa de Tultitldn, SIN EMBARGO (Oct. 20, 2016, 4:22 PM), http://www.sinembargo.mx/2010-2016/3106235 [https://perma.ce/FQ2G-PJGE] (archived Feb. 27, 2017).
98.
Hana Anderson, Women Should Not Have to Choose Between Employment
and Safety: In Garment Factories They Do, FASHION L. (Aug. 15, 2017),
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/the-global-garment-industry-and-the-women-thatsuffer-to-make-it-possible [https://perma.cclKCX6-P7RM] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
Kolben, supra note 9, at 426.
99.
100.
Id. at 435.
101.
O'Rourke, supra note 38, at.7, 10-11.
102.
Kolben, supra note 9, at 427.
103.
Id. at 428.
104.
Id. at 427.
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laws and enforce them with more or less success even in cases where
private regulatory initiatives exist to monitor labor violations.10 5 And
just as public governance has fallen short in enforcing labor standards,
private governance also has its shortcomings. 06 The existence of these
two imperfect regulatory regimes-both private and public-exercising
control over the same factories and even purporting to enforce the same
laws, begs the question of how the two regimes coexist.1 07 This subpart
recognizes the shortcomings and weaknesses of each regulatory actor,
which can provide an opportunity for coordination between the regimes
to increase the effectiveness of both.
A. The Achilles Heel of Public and Private TransnationalLabor
Governance
Traditional state-centered labor regulation model-in developing
countries especially-does not withstand the challenges posed when
"market actors engage in cross-border economic activity in the absence
of strong regulatory institutions with clear jurisdiction."1 08 Private
governance mechanisms are needed to supplement public governance;
although TPLR faces challenges of its own in proving its effectiveness,
sustainability, scope, and democratic legitimacy.10 9
1.

Public Governance

Even in countries where public institutions are strong and
regulatory enforcement of labor standards is rigorous, unilateral public
governance solutions to transnational supply chain management can
prove disastrous."i0 The United States' Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) Rule for Conflict Mineral Supply Chain Disclosure
exposes how purely public governance to address a transnational
supply chain problem can ultimately backfire."' Section 1502 of the

105.
Id.
106.
See id. at 438 (explaining that private labor governance tends to be weak in
demanding enforcement of the right of association and union building).
107.
Id. at 427; Matthew Amengual, Complementary Labor Regulation: The
UncoordinatedCombination of State and PrivateRegulators in the Dominican Republic,
38 WORLD DEV. 405, 412 (2010). 0
Kolben, supra note 9, at 428, 434.
108.
109.
LOCKE, supra note 14, at 31; Kolben, supra note 9, at 437-40.
See, e.g., Christopher M. F. Smith, Back on the (Supply) Chain Gang:
110.
Whether the SEC Final Rule for Supply Chain Disclosure is the Beginning of Purely
Social and EnvironmentalDisclosure, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 192, 209-10 (2014) (explaining
that the requirements imposed by § 1502 of Dodd-Frank resulted in further
militarization of the mining industry and economic conflict in the Democratic Republic
of Congo).
111.
See id. at 197, 209. On June 8, 2017 the U.S. House of Representatives
passed the Financial CHOICE Act, which would repeal large parts of Dodd Frank,
including the SEC's conflict mineral rule. Dynda A. Thomas, Financial CHOICE Act
Passes House-Would Repeal SEC Conflict Minerals Rule, NAT'L L. REV. (June 9, 2017),
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Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank) includes a provision that requires the SEC to promulgate a rule
obliging issuers to disclose the country of origin of certain "conflict
minerals" the issuer purchases.1 12 The purpose of the disclosure, based
purely on social policy grounds, was to force issuers to conduct due
diligence assessments of their supply chains.1 13
"Conflict minerals" are elements that are commonly used in the
manufacturing of a number of electronic devices.11 4 Tin, tungsten,
tantalum, and gold are all included under the conflict mineral
umbrella."1 5 Each of these minerals is commonly harvested in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).1"6 In Eastern DRC, militant
groups mine, tax, and sell the conflict minerals on the black market." 7
The militant groups, in turn, use the profits to finance the enslavement
of the local population." 8 The goal of the SEC's conflict mineral
disclosure rule is "to elicit public pressure on companies to ensure that
their products are conflict free.""i 9 As a result, the rule would constrict
the financing of brutal Eastern DRC armed groups and decrease the
oppression suffered by the Congolese people-a laudable goal to be
sure. 120
Despite US lawmakers' best intentions, however, the rule caused
further militarization of the mining industry in the DRC. As a
consequence of the SEC's conflict mineral disclosure rule, companies
began to refuse to buy Congolese tin because the cost of investigating,
reporting, and disclosing under the new rule was prohibitive.12' The
divestment in Congolese tin forced legitimate, artisanal miners out of
the industry and into the arms of militant groups that mine gold, as
gold is easier to smuggle than other conflict minerals.1 2 2 The options
for out of work artisanal tin miners in Eastern DRC are limited to
subsistence farming, joining the militia, or gold mining-all of which

https://www.natlawreview.com/article/financial-choice-act-passes-house-would-repealsec-conflict-minerals-rule [https://perma.cclL8PT-M6KJ] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
112.
Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see Smith, supra
note 110, at 192-97 (describing the requirements imposed by § 1502 and the
subsequently promulgated rule).
113.
See Smith, supra note 110, at 198 (requiring "due diligence measures [to be]
taken to discover 'the source and chain of custody of its conflict materials"').
114.
Id. at 197.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.; ENOUGHproject, Conflict Minerals 101, YOUTUBE (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-aF-sJgcoY20 [https://perma.ccNK98-MLR4] (archived
Feb. 27, 2017).
119.
Smith, supra note 110, at 198; Conflict Minerals 101, supra note 118.
120.
Smith, supra note 110, at 198.
121.
Id. at 209.
122.
Id.
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pay a pittance, if at all.' 2 3 In a final tally, it was estimated that the
proposed SEC rule for the disclosure of conflict minerals forced 5-12
million Congolese into economic hardship.1 24 The SEC's conflict
mineral disclosure rule serves as a cautionary tale for well-meaning
developed nations that attempt to unilaterally remediate labor issues
abroad absent the cultural context.
Developing nations' governments, however, are particularly poorly
suited to carry out the rigorous monitoring required to prevent labor
abuses in global supply chains.1 25 As discussed above, there are a
variety of factors that prevent developing regulatory states from
meeting labor enforcement demands. 126 For example, developing
countries may struggle with "a lack of funding for enforcement bodies,
political corruption, a lack of skills, and lack of will to regulate for fear
of losing a competitive advantage in price-sensitive manufacturing
sectors that are low on the value chain . . . ."127 Since labor law is
typically the exclusive domain of state governance, it is particularly
detrimental to workers that supplier states have low capacities for
enforcement, and it is typically ineffective to look to international
organizations to fill those governance deficits. The implementation of
private, non-state, and transnational governance tools has therefore
been key to plugging the holes in developing countries' regulatory labor
28
deficitS.1
2.

Private Governance

TPLR's inability to deliver on its promises to raise labor standards
in supply chain factories has put into question its viability as an
alternative to public labor governance.1 2 9 A study conducted by
Richard M. Locke, Brown University Provost and international labor
rights scholar, revealed that private governance systems have failed to
improve labor conditions in supply chains where consumers pressure
downstream buyers by monitoring labor standard compliance at their
upstream suppliers. 3 0 Locke's data showed that labor standards were
higher in factories where the state takes steps to enforce the country's
labor law.' 3 ' Drawing from Locke's study, Kevin Kolben identified four

123.
Id.
124.
Id.
Kolben, supra note 9, at 435.
125.
See supra Part II(A).
126.
127.
Kolben, supra note 9, at 435.
128.
Id.
See LOCKE, supra note 14, at 31; Kolben, supra note 9, at 437.
129.
See LOCKE, supra note 14, at 31; Kolben, supra note 9, at 437; see also
130.
Richard M. Locke: Biography, Brown University, http://watson.brown.edulpublicpolicy/people/faculty/richard-m-locke [https://perma.cc/3JF4-VQBU] (archived Feb. 27,
2017).
131.
LOCKE, supra note 14, at 172-73. A finding that proves stronger public
institutions ensure better labor law compliance in factories is not a novel discovery.
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qualities that make private governance an inadequate substitute for
and
sustainability,
scope,
governance:
effectiveness,
public
legitimacy. 132
a.

Effectiveness

Apart from the criticism that private labor regulation is second
best to strong public enforcement, there are clear indications that
private monitoring and self-monitoring are flawed.13 3 A former factory
inspector at a third-party compliance inspection company recalled the
mistakes, complications, and defects he witnessed while inspecting
factories abroad. 134 The inspector, T.A. Frank, explained that one or
two inspectors would perform up to three inspections per day.1 35 One
inspector might look over the factory's permits, employment, and
payroll records for inconsistencies, while the other toured the factory
floor. 13 6 Afterwards, inspectors would conduct interviews with up to
twenty employees.1 3 7 Many times the employees interviewed were
vetted and coached to lie during questioning-covering up the fact that
they worked far longer than their time cards indicated or that their
employers had confiscated their identification documents. 3 8 Some
factories would go as far as producing "[fjalse time cards and payroll
records, [spend] whole days . . . coaching employees on how to lie during.
interviews, and even renam[e] certain factory buildings in order to
create a smaller Potemkin village" in order to fool inspectors.i 3 9
Frank explained that inspectors inevitably missed signs of
noncompliance and abuse.1 40 For instance, Frank recalled that at a
follow-up inspection on a factory in Bangkok, a second inspector

There is no denying that in an ideal world, all countries would have strong public
institutions to rigorously enforce labor standards. But unfortunately, that is not the case,
and in some countries, making strong public institutions is not even on the political
agenda.

132.
Kolben, supra note 9, at 437-40.
133.
Factory inspections performed by public entities, if they occur at all, are
similarly flawed. Even when they are conducted in earnest, the inspection process is
inherently predisposed to human error and deception. Regardless, private inspections
pose a bevy of different complications, because there are often language barriers or
cultural barriers between inspectors and the factory employees. Additionally, when
inspectors for private certifiers are foreign or contracted by foreign buyers, the factory
employees may assume that the inspectors' allegiance lies with management rather than
with the employees. See Amengual, supra note 107, at 407-08.
134.
T.A. Frank, Confessions of a Sweatshop Inspector, WASH. MONTHLY, April
2008, at 34, 35-36.
135.
Id. at 35.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. at 36.

2018]

REINFORCING LINKS IN THE CHAIN

315

discovered pregnant workers hidden on the factory roof and Burmese
migrant workers earning criminally low wages.1 4 1 An inspector at one
factory in the Dominican Republic explained that workers were afraid
to complain about working conditions to multinational inspectors for
fear that they would lose their jobs, either because the inspector would
tell management, or because the factory would close after the buyer
looked elsewhere for a compliant supplier.1 4 2
Frank reported that the biggest challenge as an inispector was
detecting what portions of the inspections were accurate depictions of
factory conditions and which were performance and fatade used to
manipulate inspectors into certifying noncompliant suppliers. 4 3 While
it seems inevitable that some poor factory conditions will avoid
detection, the consequences for certifying a noncompliant factory are
serious considering that one supplier factory can serve up to thirty-two
different buyers.1 44
Another challenge posed by supply chain factory inspections is the
mere fact that the production of apparel and technological gadgets is
"decomposable." Decomposability, as it pertains to manufacturing,refers to a process in which the stages of production can be "separated
from each other and sequenced, with each one completed or nearlycompleted before it is passed along to become an input into the next
step."1 45 This presents itself as a problem in supply chain certification
when a single business entity partitions itself into modules in the
production process. For example, a WRAP inspector visited a factory
in the Dominican Republic that separated a single facility into the
"cutting operation" and the "assembling operation" with a wall.1 46
While two different firms owned the different operations on paper,
WRAP inspectors suspected that both the cutting and assembling
operation were owned and operated by the same parties.1 4 7 The
partitioning of the operations effectively allowed the firm owners to
have the cutting operation WRAP-certified without resolving the
health and safety issues posed by the assembly operation.1 48 Nothing
then precludes the cutting operations firm from obtaining sales
contracts under the benefit of certification, while simultaneously
subcontracting with the uncertified assembling operations, completely
unbeknownst to the buyer.

141.
Id. at 35.
Amengual, supra note 107, at 408.
142.
143.
Frank, supra note 134, at 35-36.
Stephanie Barrientos & Sally Smith, Do Workers Benefit from Ethical Trade?
144.
Assessing Codes of Labour Practice in Global ProductionSystems, 28 THIRD WORLD Q.
713, 719 (2007).
145.
Blair, O'Hara O'Connor & Kirchhoefer, supra note 5, at 280.
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Blair, O'Hara O'Connor & Kirchhoefer, supra note 5, at 281 n.55.
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Sustainability

The sustainability of TPLR compliance regimes is also deficient,
since the incentive to rigorously monitor waxes and wanes.1 4 9 The rise
of private governance tools in the monitoring of labor conditions in
supply chains was precipitated by consumer and stakeholder
demand. 5 0 Unfortunately, consumers have short attention spans. 15 ' If
downstream corporate buyers perceive that consumer and stakeholder
demand for supply chain labor compliance is waning or attention has
standards
on
environmental
been
placed
elsewhere-say
enforcement-there is little economic incentive to keep up with supply
chain labor monitoring.1 52
The inconsistency in consumer and stakeholder pressure on
corporations to ensure supply chain labor compliance found in private
governance regimes is less of a sustainability concern in active and
functional state governments. 5 3 In traditional public governance
regimes, the momentum to continue labor regulation is driven
primarily by the fear that workers will organize to oust the current
management and the fear of ensuing economic and industrial
instability.1 54 By contrast, in the context of the supply chain, the global
consumers' leverage over the buyer firm and suppliers is weak.' 55
Consumers are large in number and unable to easily organize to
maintain continuous pressure on global brands to comply with labor
standards after the shock of a factory disaster wears off.
c.

Narrow Scope

TPLRs are generally narrow in their scope, which leaves certain
types of labor initiatives untapped.1 56 Private actors, for example, tend
to be better at improving the technical performance of suppliers-such
as helping factories comply with health and safety standards,
implementing codes of conduct, or providing a system by which
157
employees are paid within the requirements of the rule of law.
However, TPLRs are generally less adept at promoting freedom of

149.
Kolben, supra note 9, at 438.
150.
GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BoYcoTT: LABoii RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 143 (2007); Kolben, supranote 9, at 438.
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association rights, collective bargaining rights, and enforcing antidiscrimination laws. 158
Most buyer codes of conduct stipulate that their suppliers comply
with local laws; however, codes tend to sidestep potential conflicts of
law.159 The codes often reference the International Labor
Organization's (ILO) standards for freedom of association, but in
countries where freedom of association is restricted by law-like China
and Vietnam-there is a conflict between ILO standards and local
laws.16 0 ILO Convention 87 provides that "workers and employers,
without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and,
subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join
organisations of their own choosing without previous authorization." 16 1
Additionally, ILO Convention 87 declares that "[t]he public authorities
shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or
impede the lawful exercise thereof' and "the law of the land shall not
be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the
guarantees provided for in this Convention."1 62 FLA standards do not.
directly address this conflict of laws, but merely assert that "employers
shall bargain with any union that has been recognized by law . .
provided such agreement does not contravene national law."1 6 3 Since
FLA guidelines require participating firms to subsume local law
regarding freedom of association, firms can comply with their
certification standards while continuing to buy from nations that
restrict freedom of association.' 64
The consumers and stakeholders that act as the driving force
behind TPLR regimes are criticized for emphasizing the victimization
of workers, "rather than creating vehicles for negotiation and
bargaining" between workers and their employers.1 65 For example,
TPLRs tend to focus on causes that tug at the heartstrings, like child
labor, labor trafficking, and health and safety risks posed in factories.
It is fair to say that eradicating those conditions in global supply chains
through TPLRs is important. However, they tend to be
disproportionately represented when other, perhaps less scandalous,
labor conditions need attention from private regulators.
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Legitimacy

TPLR detractors often question how a private actor can
legitimately regulate labor when public governance institutions exist
to perform the same function.1 66 In contrast, public institutions are
inherently vested, at least in theory, with democratic legitimacy and
operate with legal authority, since they are accountable to the public
for their action or inaction. Private institutions, on the other hand,
must answer to their stakeholders-who are not necessarily the
subjects of their regulation. Consequently, the "regimes of norm
enforcement . . . are not necessarily responsive or accountable to the
67
needs and wishes of the regulated parties, particularly workers."'
While third party inspectors and buyer codes of conduct
theoretically support factory employees' right to unionize, they are
68
resistant to encouraging and educating workers about those rights.1
In fact, in several factories where the buyer's code of conduct was
leveraged to make significant gains in worker unionization rights, the
factories were later shut down or lost business.1 69 Closures at factories
with outstanding labor records appear to workers as reprisals for high
labor standards, confirming workers' fears that those standards come
at the cost of their jobs. One inspector warned: "you don't want to be
an advocate for unions"-likely because in some countries association
with a union can prove fatal. 170 Ultimately, private regulators'
interests appear detached from the workers' interests, and therefore,
have no effect where the workers still view their governments as
71
neutral forums with which to file workplace grievances.
3.

Battle of the Norms: When Public and Private Governance

Regimes Collide
Neither public nor private labor regulations operate in a vacuum.
Both exist alongside one another, purporting to regulate the same
factories and monitor their compliance with the same laws.1 72 But each
regime has proven that it cannot operate alone to remedy gaps in
transnational labor regulation.17 3 When actors in the two regimes
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(describing the purges of union leaders in Indonesia during the 1990s); Gold et al., supra
note 1 (explaining that three workers at a Chinese factory were arrested for investigating
the facilities producing Ivanka Trump's products and that dozens of Bangladeshi labor
organizers were arrested for striking and demanding higher wages).
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refuse to work together to complement the others' weakness, their
efforts are rudderless and duplicative. Interactions between
stakeholders in the private and public regulatory regimes can be
asymmetrical and antagonistic, but they need not be.174
Some scholars argue that the private regulatory regime has
wholly displaced the need for public regulation in transnational labor
contexts.' 75 When the attitude of private regulators is to displace the
extant public regime, the result is competition and rivalry between the
regimes' actors.1 76 While a competitive relationship is not necessarily
negative-indeed the competition may increase labor enforcement-it
can undermine the legitimacy of one or both regimes. 7 7
There are two levels at which public and private regimes can
overlap in scope, but differ in content.17 8 The first level is on paper.' 7 9
Private standards can require that suppliers comply with national law
and remain silent about the particular practices, require certain
practices that exceed or fall below the requirements of national law, or
require practices that are substantively similar to national law,
resulting in de facto overlap. 8 0 The second level is how the different,
regimes apply their standards in practice.i81 Whether the regimes
complement one another or conflict can often be determined by how
they respond to circumstances "that disrupt the apparent compatibility
of the rules."' 8 2 If a conflict in public law and private standards is met
with a compromise-oriented solution, the regimes are likely
complementary.18 3 When such a conflict results in the automatic
deferral to one regime over the other, then the standards are likely in
conflict.1 84
Indonesian labor law provides an example of a circumstance in
which a private regulator's standards may match Indonesian law on
paper, but the variations in enforcement on the ground could put public
and private regimes at odds.1sS As the law on the books stands,
Indonesia has a robust set of labor protections; however, enforcement
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of labor law is weak and fragmented.18 6 Often discretion to enforce
labor law is left with the employer and legacy unions-that is unions
that have been traditionally favored by the government and are
uncomfortably cozy with management.18 7
At Panarub factory in Tangerang, Indonesia-an Adidas
supplier-an insurgent union challenged the legacy union.18 8 As the
conflict between the unions intensified, the leaders of the insurgent
union were harassed or fired.1 89 Ultimately the two unions were unable
to negotiate union verification terms and "Adidas declined to get
directly involved in this process." 19 0 Global brands often claim that the
interpretation and implementation of complex freedom of association
laws from country to country fall outside the purview of corporate
social responsibility.1 9 1 Adidas and private regulators missed an
opportunity to collaborate with the public regime to create a
meaningful mechanism to sort out labor union conflicts.
Another factory, PT Kasrie in East Java, had its certification
challenged by a separate international NGO. The previous auditing
firm ignored the fact that factory management had successfully
quashed an insurgent union by firing its organizers.1 92 Social
Accountability
International
(SAI),
the
accreditation
body,
investigated the faulty certification, but ultimately allowed the
certification to stand.19 3 SAI argued that there was no path to remedy
the original audit, since the insurgent union no longer existed at the
factory.1 94 Once again, private regulators declined to act as a bulwark
between the disjointed enforcement of Indonesian law on paper versus
in practice.
B. Taking Advantage of Synergistic Gains:Private and Public
Working Together
Three examples stand out as potential models for success when it
comes to public and private labor regulation coexistence: the
Dominican Republic, Jordan, and Brazil. 9 5 Each of the programs in
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these countries highlight the ways in which private and public labor
regulators can be mutually supportive. 196 This complementarity
among regimes can take several forms: comparative advantage,
reallocation of resources, and symbiosis. The following case studies
provide examples of each form.
1.

The Dominican Republic

A study of the interaction between public institutions and
private labor regulation in the Dominican Republic revealed a
complementary relationship. "[I]nstead of displacing state labor
regulation or causing state institutions to atrophy, private regulation
relieve[d] pressure on scarce resources and complement[ed] state
action within the factories." 97 For example, private regulation focused
on export-oriented factories, leaving more state resources to monitor
sectors of the Dominican economy that manufacture products for the
domestic market.19 8 Domestic production factories typically had even
worse labor conditions than export-oriented factories.19 9 Private
regulation alone was not up to the task of monitoring export-oriented
factories absent state regulation; however, both regimes operate in
those factories with an emphasis on the enforcement in which they
have a comparative advantage. 200 As a result, "their respective inputs
[are] non-substitutable and result in positive-sum gains." 20 1
A global apparel brand, dubbed ABC by researchers, and the
Secretaria de Estado de Trabajo (SET), the state's labor regulatory
authority, were monitored to elucidate best practices for public and
private regulatory complementarity. 202 ABC's audits were conducted
once a year at factories in its Latin American division. 203 Management
was usually apprised of the visits beforehand, although some surprise
auditing was implemented.20 4 ABC's private inspectors took pains to
ensure that the identities of the workers they interviewed were not
known to management in order to foster trust between the workers and
their multinational interviewers. 20 5 ABC inspectors nevertheless
recognized that workers still feared that they would suffer retaliation
if they complained and that their inquiry had its limitations in
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scope. 2 06 ABC admitted that its audits did not focus on freedom of
association, but where ABC's monitoring lacked, SET's audits
specialized. 20 7
SET's monitoring and auditing mechanism is driven largely by
complaints from workers and outside NGOs. 20 8 Therefore, SET's audits
can be focused and reactive, while ABC's tend to be more generalized
and preventative. 20 9 The result of the layered monitoring, in theory,
was full coverage of potential violations.
SET's and ABC's simultaneous monitoring can even intersect in a
symbiotic manner. ABC, for example, requires its factories to provide
permits and documentation from SET in order to comply with its
standards. 210 A study reports that "demands for state inspectors from
employers have, if anything, increased as a result of private
regulators."2 1 1 SET complaints filed by workers have also increased

from 204,056 in 2002 to 293,073 in 2006-the same period during
which private regulation expanded in the industry.2 12 Thus, contrary
to scholarship arguing that private regulatory regimes threaten to
uproot public labor regulation, private regulators not only leave room
for public governance, but also can increase demand for it and

legitimize
2.

it. 2 1 3

Jordan

As a benefit of signing a peace treaty with Israel, the United
States granted Jordan conditional tariff reductions and a free trade
agreement. 214 As a result, the Jordanian garment industry became
economically viable in a country that had previously held no
comparative advantage in the industry.2 15 Most of the fledgling
industry's workers were foreign migrants from Southeast Asian
countries. 216 The Institute for Global Labor and Human Rights shined
a spotlight on the fact that workers were subjected to impossibly long
work hours, beatings, sexual assault, routine theft of documents, and
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atrocious living conditions. 217 With the industry's reputation at stake,
the Jordanian government welcomed an ILO-run pilot program to
provide assessment, advice, and training to employers at the factory
level. 218

The program, "Better Work Jordan" (BWJ), is a hybrid of ILO,
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and government efforts to
improve labor law compliance in Jordan's supply chains. 2 19 The
Jordanian government made participation in the program mandatory
for garment factories and their subcontractors exporting to the United
States or Israel. 220 BWJ employees conduct a preliminary factory audit
in participating factories to highlight where the factories fall out of
compliance with domestic and international labor law. 221 Auditors and
factories then work through an improvement plan over the following
four months to bring the factory into compliance. A second audit and
progress report is published after four months. Employers participate
in twelve month trainings developed by BWJ. Additionally, the data
compiled through progress reports are summarized and made publicly
available every six months in industry-wide "synthesis reports." 222
BWJ seeks to harness the power of global buyers on supply chain
maintenance. For a subscription fee, companies that buy from BWJ
factories have access to the progress reports of participating
factories.22 3 By 2015, American Eagle, Gap, Polo Ralph Lauren,
LL Bean, New Balance, Sears, Walmart, Hanes, etc. had subscribed to
the factory reports. 2 24 Access to the data arguably provides two-fold
benefits to suppliers by decreasing the risk of negative media coverage
of supply chain conditions and harmonizing the various private
monitoring reports throughout their supply chains. 225
The BWJ program has seen Jordanian domestic law change to
meet international standards, where it formerly had no law or deficient
law. Previously there had been no minimum standard for dormitory
conditions, but in 2011 the Jordanian Ministry of Health passed such
regulations. 226 Jordanian law formerly prohibited non-citizens from
participating in unions, but in 2010 those restrictions were lifted. 227
In Jordan, BWJ and the government intentionally interact to form
a partnership of sorts. The Ministry of Labor (MoL) and the Ministry
of Industry and Trade (MolT) periodically meet to discuss the program,
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which signals that the public sector views labor law enforcement as a
factor in its plan for economic growth and competitiveness.22 8
Additionally, BWJ and the MoL created a coordination plan that
includes trainings for government factory inspectors, joint trainings to
share best practices, and a reporting protocol in the event that BWJ
discovers human rights violations during an inspection. 229
The trainings and best practices partnership between the MoL
and BWJ appear to be positively impacting MoL's reputation for
diligence among factory owners. 230 At the outset of the BWJ program,
factory owners had a low opinion of MoL.231 They believed that
certification from BWJ would have a greater impact on their brand in
the international market than a blessing from the MoL. 232 Now that
BWJ has collaborated with MoL, some factory owners have noticed an
improvement in MoL inspectors' communication and diligence, thus
reinforcing the idea that private regulation can legitimize formerly
weak public institutions. 2 33
3.

Brazil

After a surge in apparel imports, local Brazilian producers turned
to smaller, informal sector manufacturing to maintain domestic
competitiveness. 234 The smaller workshops to which Brazilian
producers outsource are cheaper and more flexible than large-scale
factories, as small-scale workshops are more numerous and therefore
more expensive and difficult to monitor.2 3 5 Approximately 73 percent
of the Brazilian apparel industry was composed of firms with zero to
nine employees in 2012.236 The workshops were generally sourced from
domestic premises, which allowed them to largely fly under the
regulators' radar.2 3 7 During audits, the public labor inspectorate
discovered slave labor throughout the small-scale workshops. 238
Recognizing the changes in the apparel industry, large apparel
retail members of the Brazilian Trade Association of Textile Retailers
(ABVTEX) and the City Council of Sdo Paulo created a commission to
investigate the prevalence of labor trafficking and slave labor in the
Sdo Paulo apparel industry.23 9 The State of Sdo Paolo accounted for
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29 percent of Brazil's total textile and garment industry output. 240 In
its report, the Commission emphasized that "apparel retailers are
legally liable for working conditions throughout their entire value
chain." 241 Retailers had formerly evaded responsibility for supply
chain labor violations by referring to standard clauses in supplier
contracts that require suppliers and subcontractors to comply with
local labor laws. 242 Rejecting this argument, the Commission
emphasized that merely placing a boilerplate provision in supplier
contracts does not absolve retailers of liability for labor law noncompliance in their supply chains. 2 43 After the Commission's report,
retailers began conducting audits and publishing codes of conduct for
suppliers. 244 In addition to private audits, the public inspectors
continued factory audits, which caused many buyers to forge legally
binding Commitment to Conduct Adjustment Agreements or
compliance commitments that required the firm to monitor their entire
supply chains. 24 5
In 2013, the Sdo Paulo State Legislature became serious about
punishing firms for contracting with factories and workshops that
employed worker abuse and slave labor to make its products. 246 The
Legislature passed the harshest labor law non-compliance sanction in
the world. 24 7 Law number 14,946 created a procedure to suspend a

firm's license to operate in the State of Sdo Paulo for ten years in the
event that slave labor is discovered in any tier of the buyer's supply
chain. 24 8
The members of ABVTEX also formed a Corporate Social
Responsibility initiative of their own accord as a response to the
stricter public regulations and the Commission's report on slave
labor. 249 The Supplier Qualification Program (SQP) aimed to identify
and audit every single supplier and subcontractor in members' supply
chains. 250 Ultimately, the consortium intended to create a pool of precertified suppliers at every tier of production through SQP. 25 1 First tier
suppliers in SQP must, as a condition of certification, share a list of
their subcontractors with their ABVTEX clients and only maintain
contracts with compliant subcontractors. 2 52 Retailers were tasked with
ensuring that their suppliers and subcontracts actually complied with
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SQP standards-usually through private monitoring audits. 253 By
2014, almost six thousand suppliers and subcontractors had been
registered and audited through SQP-73 percent of which had actually
been approved.25 4

IV. GOVERNING A CONSTELLATION OF INTERESTS

Both public and private actors have a role to play in enforcing
labor standards in transnational supply chains. The complex and
multinational nature of supply chain production presents a difficult
case for traditional state-centered regulation where public institutions
are weak. Yet private regulation has, over the past decade,
demonstrated that it cannot shoulder the burden of transnational labor
regulation alone. This Note argues that all the interested partiesimporting countries, exporting countries, private regulators, buyers,
and suppliers-must act in concert to orchestrate an effective
transnational labor enforcement regime.
The compliance mechanisms mentioned above in the Dominican
Republic, Jordan, and Brazil should be emulated elsewhere. The
Dominican Republic example demonstrates that public and private
monitors can complement and even reinforce one another. 2 55 Similarly,
the BWJ program in Jordan provided evidence that making labor
compliance a mandatory goal for economic growth and competitiveness
precipitates improvements in the labor laws.25 6 The severe penalties
that accompany violations of Sdo Paulo's labor reform law give
companies the proper incentive to monitor their factories and their
subcontractors' factories for compliance.25 7 Also, Brazil's willingness to
create liability for companies that fail to enforce their own labor codes
is crucial to changing the current state of supply chain factory
conditions and compliance enforcement.2 5 8
A. Importing Countries
Typically, importing countries are developed nations with strong
public institutions. The laws of importing countries pose a credible
threat of enforcement against the entities that operate within them. It
is in these countries that the parent companies incorporate and where
the products produced on the global market are consumed. In order to
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incentivize parent companies and international brands to properly vet
their overseas suppliers and influence factory management throughout
their supply chains to comply with labor standards, importing
countries must punish labor violations in a way that resonates with
buying companies.
The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), in its
broad application to extraterritorial activity, provides a model federal
statute for importing countries to emulate in crafting a statute for
supply chain labor violation liability. 259 The FCPA contains two main
provisions: the Anti-bribery provision and the Accounting provision. 2 60
The Anti-bribery provision penalizes entities and persons paying
bribes to foreign public officials, while the Accounting Provision
2 61
mandates certain internal control and record keeping requirements.
Entities listed on an American stock exchange, employees,
shareholders, agents, and officers of the aforementioned entities,
domestic concerns, and other persons and entities acting within the
262
United States are all within the FCPA's purview.
A similar statute for labor law violations in entities' supply chains
would create the type of sustained pressure on parent companies to
contract with labor compliant factories, both on paper and in practice.
Global brands could no longer expect to evade liability or blame for
worker abuse in their supply chains by inserting standard language
requiring compliance with local labor laws in supplier contracts. Upon
finding labor abuses in a global buyer's supply chain, the company
would be required to demonstrate its procedure for monitoring its
suppliers' and subcontractors' compliance with the local and perhaps
international labor law. While some companies already strive to
collaborate with their supply chain factories to create better working
conditions, these companies are the minority-their efforts fall short
when they are confronted with a labor issue that could actually affect
263
the company's bottom line.
Under the FCPA, an entity can be penalized when its third-party
contractors violate the statute's anti-bribery provisions. 2 64 As a result,
companies subject to the statute are careful in choosing their
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contractors abroad. 265 An identical provision in the proposed labor
liability statute has the potential to expand liability all the way
through a company's supply chain. In effect, the statute could force
transparency between suppliers and buyers. Additionally, the statute
would ensure compliance of suppliers further upstream than private
governance tools can currently reach.
The business sector would surely balk at the thought of assuming
liability for more extraterritorial activity under a new federal statute,
although compliance with its provisions need not be as costly for the
industry as the reporting requirements under the SEC's Conflict
Mineral Disclosure Rule. 266 An enforcement mechanism that applies
equally to all global buyers would eradicate the collective action
problem that the handful of socially responsible brands face when
consumers pressure them to clean up their supply chains. 267 Some
factories supply more than thirty different brands, and yet, only a few
of those brands have been singled out by consumers as bad actors. 268
Pooling global brands' resources and influence could make supply
chain labor maintenance cheaper for brands that currently pull most
of the weight for factory monitoring and compliance. 269

265.
Id. at 60-61 ("DOJ's and SEC's FCPA enforcement actions demonstrate that
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B. Exporting Countries
Exporting countries-the origin of consumer products and the site
of supply chain factories-must form partnerships with existing
private labor governance organizations. Ideally those partnerships
would take the collaborative form of the BWJ program in Jordan. 270
Participation in monitoring under the partnership should not be
optional for factories and their subcontractors. Export licenses, like
those in the BWJ program, ought to be made contingent on
participation in labor monitoring, disclosure, transparency, and
training. 271
As a more general matter, factory compliance with labor law
ought to be viewed and treated as a key factor in an industry's
competitiveness in the global market. In conjunction with an FCPAlike statute for global buyers in developed nations, it would seem that
buyers would indeed place a premium on factories with stellar
compliance records and investment, in countries dedicated to
developing labor compliance programs.
Under the private-public governance partnerships, auditors
should foster an educational relationship with factory owners. Too
often, factory management abroad is portrayed as morally bankrupt
and devoid of compassion for the factory employees. 272 This narrative
sours relationships between auditors and management at the outset.
An emphasis must be placed on training factory management and
developing factory improvement plans, rather than defaulting to
sanctions any time a violation is discovered.
On the other hand, while sanctions should be a secondary remedy
to education, punishment for intentional non-compliance should be
severe. In circumstances where worker abuses or labor violations are
deliberate, the factory's license to operate should be revoked for a
.period, as required by Sio Paolo's law. 2 73 Transparency of the proposed
punishments for non-compliance would be a key deterrent. Perhaps,
the exporting government and private monitoring organizations could
develop a sentencing guideline for factory labor violations.
C. PrivateRegulators
In addition to forging relationships with public governance bodies,
private regulators should tap government licensing resources to
compile a database of suppliers and subcontractors on a country-bycountry basis. As a condition of achieving certification, first-tier
suppliers ought to provide a list of their subcontractors to private
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regulators. Similar to Brazil's SQP Consortium, private regulators
should aim to audit every supplier and subcontractor and to provide
subscribing global buyers with a list of pre-certified suppliers at every
tier of production in each participating country. Certified supplier
progress reports should be made available to subscribing buyers.
Additionally, buyers should be notified when their certified suppliers
fall out of compliance and assist in carrying out the improvement plan
at the non-compliant factory.
D. Global Buyers
The compliance department at global brands should consider
supply chain labor maintenance a priority. Two large apparel
companies-Timberland and Nike-admitted that certain buyer
practices force otherwise compliant factories to violate labor laws. 274
For example, the short expected turnaround time, the amount of
different designs a factory is expected to be able to produce for a brand,
and the submission of late or changed orders all contribute to forced
overtime work in factories. 275 Buyers need to reassess the business
practices that ultimately cause suppliers to fulfill orders that could not
possibly be completed in humane working conditions. Large brands'
unrealistic expectations for ever-faster production at ever-cheaper unit
prices undermine factory management's ability to conform to the
brand's own code of conduct. 2 76 A robust compliance program should
be implemented to ensure that buyers are not sabotaging their own
efforts to create clean supply chains.
E. Suppliers
To aid buyers in ensuring labor compliance at their supply chain
factories, suppliers must be transparent and reveal any and all
subcontractors they deal with in the course of production. If an FCPAlike statute were applied in suppliers' target markets, then suppliers'
competitiveness could depend, in part, on their willingness to be
forthcoming about their subcontractors and to improve factory worker
treatment. The first step towards creating a comprehensive monitoring
and compliance system in supply chain factories requires factory
management to accept training and advice from auditing authorities,
whether public or private. All interested parties, most importantly
workers, will benefit when the relationship between the auditing
authorities and factory management is characterized as collaborative,
instead of adversarial.
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V. CONCLUSION

Labor rights activists struggled to find a substitute regulatory
mechanism after it became clear that the traditional state-centered
regulatory model could not reach workers in the labyrinth of
international supply chains. Private regulation was touted as the
alternative to public governance by both labor activists and global
buyers. Over the past decade, however, private regulation has shown
itself to be no panacea in the supply chain labor compliance context.
Tragic news stories still report the death tolls caused by preventable
factory accidents and expos6s reveal horrendous worker conditions at
factories that have been certified by reputable private auditors. Hybrid
partnerships between public and private governance bodies have
begun to form, in order to close the monitoring gaps that plague both
systems. Although it may be too early to tell, it appears that
collaboration between public and private entities will prove to be the
most effective method to have comprehensive monitoring of labor
conditions at all tiers of the supply chain. In order for a public-private
compliance framework to thrive, the interested actors in the chain
must leverage their respective authorities to influence compliance
upstream.
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